# **Trustworthy Machine Learning**


### **Umang Bhatt**

Assistant Professor/Faculty Fellow, New York University Senior Research Associate, The Alan Turing Institute Associate Fellow, Leverhulme Center for the Future of Intelligence





@umangsbhatt <u>umangbhatt@nyu.edu</u>





# Human-Al Team










### Stakeholder

### Human-Al Team




V.V.



Me








Transparency


Collaboration




**Evaluation** 








# **Research Style**









**B**, Xiang, Sharma, Weller, Taly, Jia, Ghosh, Puri, Moura, Eckersley. *Explainable Machine Learning in Deployment*. ACM FAccT. 2020.

### **Transparency Mechanisms**

How can we use transparency mechanisms to demonstrate the trustworthiness of AI systems?










Transparency means providing stakeholders with *relevant* information about how a system works


**B**, Xiang, Sharma, Weller, Taly, Jia, Ghosh, Puri, Moura, Eckersley. *Explainable Machine Learning in Deployment*. ACM FAccT. 2020.



Brogle, Kallina, Sargeant, Shankar, Casovan, Weller, B. Context-Specific Certification of AI Systems: A Pilot in the Financial Industry. Under Review. 2024. Barker, Kallina, Ashok, Collins, Casovan, Weller, Talwalkar, Chen, B. FeedbackLogs: Recording and Incorporating Stakeholder Feedback. ACM EAAMO. 2023. **B**, Shams. Trust in Artificial Intelligence: Clinicians Are Essential. Chapter 10 in Healthcare Information Technology for Cardiovascular Medicine. 2021.









### Explainability means providing insight into a model's behavior for specific datapoint(s)


B, Andrus, Xiang, Weller. Machine Learning Explainability for External Stakeholders. ICML WHI. 2020. **B**, Xiang, Sharma, Weller, Taly, Jia, Ghosh, Puri, Moura, Eckersley. *Explainable Machine Learning in Deployment*. ACM FAccT. 2020.






**B**, Andrus, Xiang, Weller. *Machine Learning Explainability for External Stakeholders*. ICML WHI. 2020. B, Xiang, Sharma, Weller, Taly, Jia, Ghosh, Puri, Moura, Eckersley. Explainable Machine Learning in Deployment. ACM FAccT. 2020.










### **Explainability** methods are **not** in service of transparency goals within organizations

**B**, Andrus, Xiang, Weller. *Machine Learning Explainability for External Stakeholders*. ICML WHI. 2020. **B**, Xiang, Sharma, Weller, Taly, Jia, Ghosh, Puri, Moura, Eckersley. *Explainable Machine Learning in Deployment*. ACM FAccT. 2020.







**B**, Moura, Weller. Evaluating and Aggregating Feature-based Model Explanations. IJCAI. 2020. Chapman, **B**, Pazos, Schulz, Georgatzis. FIMAP: Feature Importance by Minimal Adversarial Perturbation. AAAI. 2021. Dimanov, **B**, Jamnik, Weller. You shouldn't trust me: Learning models which conceal unfairness from multiple explanation methods. ECAI. 2020. von Kügelgen, Karimi, **B**, Valera, Weller, Schölkopf. On the fairness of causal algorithmic recourse. AAAI. 2022.









**B**, Moura, Weller. Evaluating and Aggregating Feature-based Model Explanations. IJCAI. 2020. Chapman, **B**, Pazos, Schulz, Georgatzis. FIMAP: Feature Importance by Minimal Adversarial Perturbation. AAAI. 2021. Dimanov, **B**, Jamnik, Weller. You shouldn't trust me: Learning models which conceal unfairness from multiple explanation methods. ECAI. 2020. von Kügelgen, Karimi, **B**, Valera, Weller, Schölkopf. On the fairness of causal algorithmic recourse. AAAI. 2022.










- Fairness: Measurement and Sampling Bias
- **Decision-Making:** Building **Reject Option Classifiers**
- Trust Formation: ABI

**B**, Antoran, Zhang, Liao, Sattigeri, Fogliato, et al. Uncertainty as a Form of Transparency: Measuring, Communicating, and Using Uncertainty. ACM AIES. 2021.












Antoran, **B**, Adel, Weller, Hernandez-Lobato. Getting a CLUE: A Method for Explaining Uncertainty Estimates. ICLR. 2021. Ley, **B**, Weller. Diverse and Amortised Counterfactual Explanations for Uncertainty Estimates. AAAI. 2022. Babbar, **B**, Weller. On the Utility of Prediction Sets in Human-Al Teams. IJCAI. 2022. Martinez, **B**, Weller, Cherubin. Approximating full conformal prediction at scale via influence functions. AAAI. 2023.









<u>Babbar</u>, **B**, Weller. On the Utility of Prediction Sets in Human-AI Teams. IJCAI. 2022.





How can we align transparency mechanisms with **regulatory** requirements? How can we use **natural language** uncertainty explanations to improve trustworthiness?



Babbar, **B**, Weller. On the Utility of Prediction Sets in Human-Al Teams. IJCAI. 2022. Chen\*, **B\***, Heidari, Weller, Talwalkar. Perspectives on Incorporating Expert Feedback into Model Updates. Patterns. 2023.




### How can AI systems work **alongside** human decision-makers?

**B\***, Sargeant\*. When Should Algorithms Resign? IEEE Computer. 2024. B\*, Chen\*, Collins, P. Kamalaruban, Kallina, Weller, Talwalkar. Learning Personalized Decision Support Policies. AAAI. 2025. Chen\*, B\*, Heidari, Weller, Talwalkar. Perspectives on Incorporating Expert Feedback into Model Updates. Patterns. 2023.


### **Effective Human-Al Collaboration**






**B\***, Sargeant\*. When Should Algorithms Resign? IEEE Computer. 2024. B\*, Chen\*, Collins, P. Kamalaruban, Kallina, Weller, Talwalkar. Learning Personalized Decision Support Policies. AAAI. 2025. Chen\*, B\*, Heidari, Weller, Talwalkar. Perspectives on Incorporating Expert Feedback into Model Updates. Patterns. 2023.

# **Effective Human-Al Collaboration**



Collins\*, Sucholutsky\*, **B\***, Chandra, Wong, Lee, Zhang, Zhi-Xuan, Ho, Mansinghka, Weller, Tenenbaum, Griffiths. Building machines that learn and think with people. Nature Human Behavior. 2024.



How good is a human?

$$\ell(y,\bar{y})$$

How good is the AI?  $\ell(y, \hat{y})$ 

### How good is the team? $\ell(y, \tilde{y})$

How much does AI help?  $\ell(\bar{y},\tilde{y})$ 







# **Effective Human-Al Collaboration**




Dietvorst, Simmons, Massey. Algorithm aversion: People Erroneously Avoid Algorithms after Seeing Them Err. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 2015. Logg, Minson, Moore. Algorithm appreciation: People prefer algorithmic to human judgment. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 2019. Zerilli, **B**, Weller. How transparency modulates trust in artificial intelligence. Patterns. 2022.

increases







### **Tesla wins first US Autopilot tria** involving fatal crash

By **Dan Levine** and **Hyunjoo Jin** November 1, 2023 12:58 AM EDT · Updated a month ago

Zerilli, **B**, Weller. How transparency modulates trust in artificial intelligence. Patterns. 2022.


### Is your health insurer using AI to deny you services? Lawsuit says errors harmed elders.



Published 5:18 a.m. ET Nov. 19, 2023 Updated 11:19 a.m. ET Nov. 20, 2023



# **Effective Human-Al Collaboration**




Cost

### Performance


**B\***, Sargeant\*. When Should Algorithms Resign? IEEE Computer. 2024.

B\*, Chen\*, Collins, P. Kamalaruban, Kallina, Weller, Talwalkar. Learning Personalized Decision Support Policies. AAAI. 2025.

### Veil of Selectivity







**B\***, Sargeant\*. When Should Algorithms Resign? IEEE Computer. 2024. B\*, Chen\*, Collins, P. Kamalaruban, Kallina, Weller, Talwalkar. Learning Personalized Decision Support Policies. AAAI. 2025.



### **Online Learning**

**B\***, Sargeant\*. When Should Algorithms Resign? IEEE Computer. 2024. **B\***, Chen\*, Collins, P. Kamalaruban, Kallina, Weller, Talwalkar. *Learning Personalized Decision Support Policies*. AAAI. 2025. Collins, Chen, Sucholutsky, Kirk, Sadek, Sargeant, Talwalkar, Weller, B. Modulating Language Model Experiences through Frictions. Under Review. 2024.

### Learning from Prior Data

**Rule-Based** 





### Foul detection with soccer referees

### Visual pollution detection with city inspectors

**B\***, Sargeant\*. When Should Algorithms Resign? IEEE Computer. 2024. **B\***, Chen\*, Collins, P. Kamalaruban, Kallina, Weller, Talwalkar. *Learning Personalized Decision Support Policies*. AAAI. 2025. Collins, Chen, Sucholutsky, Kirk, Sadek, Sargeant, Talwalkar, Weller, **B**. Modulating Language Model Experiences through Frictions. Under Review. 2024.

### **Effective Human-Al Collaboration**

**User Study** 

Under what conditions is **selective** access to AI assistance helpful?






### Mortality prediction with cardiologists






# **Effective Human-Al Collaboration**



Hertwig, Erev. *The description-experience gap in risky choice*. Trends in Cognitive Science. 2009. Chen\*, **B\***, Heidari, Weller, Talwalkar. *Perspectives on Incorporating Expert Feedback into Model Updates*. Patterns. 2023.






Collins\*, **B\***, Weller. Eliciting and Learning with Soft Labels from Every Annotator. AAAI HCOMP. 2022. Collins, **B**, Liu, Piratla, Sucholutsky, Love, Weller. *Human-in-the-Loop mixUp*. UAI. 2023. Collins, Barker, Espinosa, Raman, B, Jamnik, Sucholutsky, Weller, Dvijotham. Human Uncertainty in Concept-Based AI Systems. ACM AIES. 2023. Barker, Collins, Dvijotham, Weller, B. Selective Concept Models: Permitting Stakeholder Customization at Test-Time. AAAI HCOMP. 2023.


# **Effective Human-Al Collaboration**






# **Effective Human-Al Collaboration**

### How do feedback mechanisms vary across cultures and contexts?








Babbar, **B**, Weller. On the Utility of Prediction Sets in Human-Al Teams. IJCAI. 2022.


# Interactive Human-Centered Evaluation







Collins, Jiang, Frider, Wong, Zilka, **B**, Lukasiewicz, Wu, Tenenbaum, Hart, Gowers, Li, Weller, Jamnik. *When Should Algorithms Evaluating language models for mathematics through interactions*. PNAS. 2024.

# Interactive Human-Centered Evaluation






- Observing usage patterns teases out differences between perceived helpfulness and correctness
- 2. Unconfident participants rated incorrect LLM responses as correct
- **3.** Interactive evaluation of LLM outputs is key







Collins, Jiang, Frider, Wong, Zilka, **B**, Lukasiewicz, Wu, Tenenbaum, Hart, Gowers, Li, Weller, Jamnik. When Should Algorithms Evaluating language models for mathematics through interactions. PNAS. 2024.

# Interactive Human-Centered Evaluation


Regular users of LLMs ask for definitions rather than the query itself



Al System	
	Hum
	Ε


### What would interactive evaluation of LLMs look like for **humanities**, such as interpreting poetry or critiquing art?

Collins, Jiang, Frider, Wong, Zilka, **B**, Lukasiewicz, Wu, Tenenbaum, Hart, Gowers, Li, Weller, Jamnik. When Should Algorithms Evaluating language models for mathematics through interactions. PNAS. 2024.






# Interactive Human-Centered Evaluation



### **Evaluation**

How can we catalog how AI systems are deployed to understand their design, governance, and impact in practice?







My research spans multiple disciplines and various research CHIA

communities is important: practical coursework and rigorous a research

After spending time at Carnegie Mellon, NYU, and Harvard, I find the powerhouse for practical human-Al interaction research

# Why CHIA?

- programmes, including Responsible AI, Social/Interactive AI, and Cognitive AI
- Empowering MPhil and PhD students to build **and** deploy Al inspired by their
- Cambridge ecosystem unmatched I want to help CHIA establish itself as a

## **Computer Science & Engineering**



**Isabel Chien** Cambridge



J.M.H Lobato Cambridge



Mateja Jamnik Cambridge



Javier Antorán Cambridge



Katie Collins Cambridge





Riccardo Fogliato Peter Eckersley PAI Amazon



Lama Nachman Intel



P. Kamalaruban Turing



Duke



**Matthew Barker** Trustwise



Elaf Alamhmoud Andrew Wilson NYU NYU







Bradley Love UCL



Josh Tenenbaum MIT



Simone Schnall Cambridge



**Tom Griffiths** Princeton

NYU

Brenden Lake

**Guy Davidson** NYU



Kendall Brogle Turing



<u>Emma Kallina</u> Cambridge



Dan Ley

Harvard



Valerie Chen

CMU





Ameet Talwalkar CMU



Hoda Heidari CMU



Joydeep Ghosh Shubham Sharma UT Austin



Yunfeng Zhang Twitter













Sanyam Kapoor Ilia Sucholutsky NYU



**Albert Jiang** Mistral



**Ruchir Puri** 

IBM

<u>Hannah Kirk</u> Oxford











Karen Yeung Birmingham



**Becca Ricks** Mozilla



**Dorian Peters** Imperial




<u>Malak Sadek</u> Imperial




John Zerilli Edinburgh



Holli Sargeant Cambridge



# **Trustworthy Machine Learning** Transparency, Collaboration, and Evaluation











@umangsbhatt <u>umangbhatt@nyu.edu</u>






### **Existing Documentation**



Barker, Kallina, Ashok, Collins, Casovan, Weller, Talwalkar, Chen, B. FeedbackLogs: Recording and Incorporating Stakeholder Feedback. ACM EAAMO. 2023.


# FeedbackLogs


### Feedback Logs











Barker, Kallina, Ashok, Collins, Casovan, Weller, Talwalkar, Chen, B. FeedbackLogs: Recording and Incorporating Stakeholder Feedback. ACM EAAMO. 2023.

# FeedbackLogs



# FeedbackLogs

### **Starting Point**

**Data:** Description of the dataset(s) used to train/test/validate the model. Models: Description of the model(s) used and any existing design decisions. Metrics: Description of the metrics used to evaluate the model(s) and their performance.

### Elicitation

Who a perform

How?

### Feedba

What?

### Incorp

v is the relevant info	rmation presented to	them? e.g. model met	rics, predictions, prot	otype.
k				
What insights have bee	n provided by the stal	keholder(s)?		
ation				
Which?	Where?	When?	Why?	Effect?
Which updates are	Where in the pipeline did the	When in the pipeline did the update occur?	Why has this update been selected?	What effect(s) did the update have on the metrics?
considered?	update occur:			
considered? Update 1	update occur? x	х	X	X
		x x	x x	x

### Summary

What? Summary of the update(s) chosen and their effect(s) on the metric(s).

### **Final Summary**

**Data:** Description of the dataset(s) used to train/test/validate the model after all updates have been applied. **Model:** Description of model(s) used and any design changes resulting from the updates. **Metric performance:** Description of the metrics to evaluate the model(s) and their performance after the above updates.


Barker, Kallina, Ashok, Collins, Casovan, Weller, Talwalkar, Chen, B. FeedbackLogs: Recording and Incorporating Stakeholder Feedback. ACM EAAMO. 2023.

### Record 1

### Record 2

...





## **Assess properties of explanations**

## **Candidate Properties**


$$\mu(f, g, x, r) = \int_{\rho(x, z) \le \infty} f(x, z) = \int_{\rho(x, z) \ge \infty} f(x, z) =$$

**B**, Moura, Weller. Evaluating and Aggregating Feature-based Model Explanations. IJCAI. 2020.

## Model $f: \mathcal{X} \mapsto \mathcal{Y}$


- Explanation Function  $g: \mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{X} \mapsto \mathbb{R}$
- Problem: "There are many of candidate explanation methods (LIME, SHAP, etc.) but it is unclear how to decide when to use each."
  - Sensitivity: Do similar inputs have similar explanations?
    - $D(g(f, x), g(f, z))\mathbb{P}_{x}(z)dz$
- Faithfulness: Does the explanation capture features important for prediction?
  - $\mu(f, g, x, S) = \operatorname{corr}(\frac{1}{|S|} \sum_{i \in S} g(f, x)_i, f(x) f(x_{[x_s = \bar{x}_s]}))$ 
    - Complexity: Is the explanation digestible?  $\mu(f, g, x) = H(x) = \mathbb{E}_i \left[ -\ln(|g(f, x)_i|) \right]$
- We go on to show how to (A) aggregate multiple explanations into a consensus and (B) how to optimize an explanation for a selected criterion






## Assure model fairness via explanations

Model A




Dimanov, **B**, Jamnik, Weller. You shouldn't trust me: Learning models which conceal unfairness from multiple explanation methods. ECAI. 2020.

Model B



Methods






## DoAssasseumeorde de la faiesse sia véa petap ativations

### **Attribution of Sensitive Attribute**

Our Goal  $f_{\theta} \to f_{\theta+\delta}$ 

 $\operatorname{argmin}_{\delta} L' = L(f_{\theta+\delta}, x, y) + \frac{\alpha}{n} \left| \left| \nabla_{\mathbf{X}_{:,j}} L(f_{\theta+\delta}, x, y) \right| \right|$ 



Heo, Joo, Moon. Fooling Neural Network interpretations via adversarial model manipulation. NeurIPS. 2019. Dimanov, **B**, Jamnik, Weller. You shouldn't trust me: Learning models which conceal unfairness from multiple explanation methods. ECAI. 2020.


**Methods** 

- $g(f, x)_i$ 
  - **1. Model Similarity**  $\forall i, f_{\theta+\delta}(\mathbf{x}^{(i)}) \approx f_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}^{(i)})$
  - 2. Low Target Attribution  $\forall i$ ,  $|g(f_{\theta+\delta}, \mathbf{x}^{(i)})_j| \ll |g(f_{\theta}, \mathbf{x}^{(i)})_j|$
- **Adversarial Explanation Attack**

Our proposed attack:

- 1. Decreases relative importance significantly.
- 2. Generalizes to test points.
- 3. Transfers across explanation methods.










of Uncertainty

## **CLUE: Counterfactual Latent Uncertainty Explanations**


Question: "Where in my input does uncertainty about my outcome lie?"



Formulation: What is the smallest change we need to make to an input, while staying in-distribution, such that our model produces more certain predictions?



Sensitivity






 $H(\mathbf{y} | \mathbf{x}_0) = 1.77$ 

 $H(\mathbf{y} \mid \mathbf{x}_{sens}) = 0.12$ 


Antoran, B, Adel, Weller, Hernandez-Lobato. Getting a CLUE: A Method for Explaining Uncertainty Estimates. ICLR. 2021. Ley, **B**, Weller. Diverse and Amortised Counterfactual Explanations for Uncertainty Estimates. AAAI. 2022.

Methods










Antoran, **B**, Adel, Weller, Hernandez-Lobato. *Getting a CLUE: A Method for Explaining Uncertainty Estimates*. ICLR. 2021. Ley, **B**, Weller. *Diverse and Amortised Counterfactual Explanations for Uncertainty Estimates*. AAAI. 2022.




### Explanations of Uncertainty

## **CLUE: Counterfactual Latent Uncertainty Explanations**

Forward Simulation: Users are shown context examples and are tasked with predicting model behavior on new datapoint.


	Uncertain		Certain		?			Combined	LSAT	COMPAS
Age	Less than 25	Age	Less than 25	Age	Less than 25					0000070
Race	Caucasian	Race	African-American	Race	Hispanic		CLUE	82.22	83.33	81.11
Sex	Male	Sex	Male	Sex	Male		Human CLUE	62.22	61.11	63.33
Current Charge	Misdemeanour	Current Charge	Misdemeanour	Current Charge	Misdemeanour		Random	61.67	62.22	61.11
Reoffended Before	Yes	Reoffended Before	No	Reoffended Before	No		Local Sensitivity	52.78	56.67	48.89
<b>Prior Convictions</b>	1	<b>Prior Convictions</b>	0	<b>Prior Convictions</b>	0	CLUE	outperforms other	approaches	with stati	stical sign
Days Served	0	Days Served	0	Days Served	0		'Using Nemenyi test f			0




Antoran, **B**, Adel, Weller, Hernandez-Lobato. Getting a CLUE: A Method for Explaining Uncertainty Estimates. ICLR. 2021. Ley, **B**, Weller. Diverse and Amortised Counterfactual Explanations for Uncertainty Estimates. AAAI. 2022.

### **User Studies**





## Generate prediction sets for experts




Vovk, Gammerman, Shafer. Algorithms in the Real World. 2005 Bates, Angelopoulos, Lei, Malik, Jordan. Distribution-Free, Risk-Controlling Prediction Sets. Journal of the ACM. 202. Babbar, **B**, Weller. On the Utility of Prediction Sets in Human-Al Teams. IJCAI. 2022.

Question: "What other outcomes are probable?"

Risk





## Generate prediction sets for experts

**Question:** Do prediction sets improve human-machine team performance?

### For CIFAR-100:

- Prediction sets are perceived to be more useful
- Users trust prediction sets more than Top-1 classifiers

Observation: Some prediction sets can be quite large, rendering them useless to experts!


Idea: Learn a deferral policy  $\pi(x) \in \{0,1\}$  and reduce prediction set size on remaining examples

Babbar, **B**, Weller. On the Utility of Prediction Sets in Human-Al Teams. IJCAI. 2022.


**User Studies** 


A CP Scheme!

		▼		
Metric	Top-1	RAPS	p value	Effect
Accuracy	$0.76~\pm0.05$	$0.76~\pm 0.05$	0.999	0.0
<b>Reported Utility</b>	$5.43 \pm 0.69$	$6.94\ \pm 0.69$	0.003	1.16
<b>Reported Confidence</b>	$7.21~\pm0.55$	$7.88\ \pm 0.29$	0.082	0.6'
<b>Reported Trust in Model</b>	$5.87{\scriptstyle~\pm~0.81}$	$8.00\ \pm 0.69$	< 0.001	1.48










We also (A) prove that set size is reduced for the non-deferred examples and (B) optimize for additional set properties (e.g., sets with similar labels).

Babbar, **B**, Weller. On the Utility of Prediction Sets in Human-Al Teams. IJCAI. 2022.

	p value	Effect Size
)5	0.003	0.832
50	< 0.001	1.138
9	0.862	0.046
51	0.006	0.754



 $X_t$ 

Formulation: For an unseen decision-maker, which available form of decision support would improve their decision outcome performance the most?

### Set Up

We select a form of support  $a_t \in A$  using a decision support policy  $\pi_t : X \to \Delta(A)$ Learn policy  $\pi_t$  using a exisiting contextual bandits techniques


The decision-maker makes the final prediction:  $\tilde{y}_t = h(x_t, a_t)$ 

Performance differs under each form of support:  $r_{A_i}(x;h) = \mathbb{E}_{y|x}[\ell(y,h(x,A_i))]$ 

B\*, Chen\*, Collins, P. Kamalaruban, Kallina, Weller, Talwalkar. Learning Personalized Decision Support Policies. Under Review. 2023.

### **Core Idea of THREAD**

Include cost of  $a_t$  in the objective



## Learning Personalized Decision Support Policies

MMLU Task: 60 questions from 4 categories Computer Science, Elementary Math, Biology, Foreign Policy **Expertise Profiles** 

- 1. Invariant:  $r_{A_1}(X_j;h) \approx r_{A_2}(X_j;h), \forall j \in [N]$ equally good (or bad) with or without LLM support
- 2. Varying:  $r_{A_1}(X_j; h) \leq r_{A_2}(X_j; h)$  and  $r_{A_2}(X_k; h) \leq r_{A_1}(X_k; h)$ better for some topics with LLM support
- 3. Strictly Better:  $r_{A_1}(X_j;h) \leq r_{A_2}(X_j;h), \forall j \in [N]$ strictly better with (or without) LLM support

Algorithm	Invariant	Strictly Better		Varying
H-Only	$0.01\pm0.01$	$0.18\pm0.17$	(	$0.22 \pm 0.12$
H-LLM	$0.01\pm0.01$	$0.18\pm0.21$	(	$0.12\pm0.17$
Population	$0.00\pm0.02$	$0.19\pm0.07$	(	$0.12\pm0.09$
THREAD-LinUCB	$0.00\pm0.01$	$0.12 \pm 0.03$	(	$0.07 \pm 0.04$
THREAD-KNN	$0.01\pm0.01$	$\boldsymbol{0.05\pm0.03}$	0	$0.05\pm0.03$


If a decision-maker benefits from having support some of the time, we can learn their policy online

B\*, Chen\*, Collins, P. Kamalaruban, Kallina, Weller, Talwalkar. Learning Personalized Decision Support Policies. Under Review. 2023.


Excess loss over optimal loss


MMLU






## Learning Personalized Decision Support Policies






B\*, Chen\*, Collins, P. Kamalaruban, Kallina, Weller, Talwalkar. Learning Personalized Decision Support Policies. Under Review. 2023.







**User Studies** 

B\*, Chen\*, Collins, P. Kamalaruban, Kallina, Weller, Talwalkar. Learning Personalized Decision Support Policies. Under Review. 2023.



## Algorithmic resignation is the *deliberate* and *informed* disengagement from Al assistance in certain scenarios.

**B\***, Sargeant\*. When Should Algorithms Resign? IEEE Computer (Forthcoming). 2024.

## Algorithmic resignation extends beyond the disuse of Al systems.

It is about embedding governance mechanisms directly within AI systems, guiding when and how these systems should be used or abstained from.

**B\***, Sargeant\*. When Should Algorithms Resign? IEEE Computer (Forthcoming). 2024. B\*, Chen\*, Collins, P. Kamalaruban, Kallina, Weller, Talwalkar. Learning Personalized Decision Support Policies. Under Review. 2023.



# **Benefits of Algorithmic Resignation**





## **Economic Efficiency**


**B\***, Sargeant\*. When Should Algorithms Resign? IEEE Computer (Forthcoming). 2024.




## **Reputational Gain**

Legal Compliance

# **Considerations for Algorithmic Resignation**





## **Friction over** Resignation

Stakeholder Incentives


**B\***, Sargeant\*. When Should Algorithms Resign? IEEE Computer (Forthcoming). 2024.




Level of Engagement


### **Access for Arts**

### **Access for STEM**



**B\***, Sargeant\*. When Should Algorithms Resign? IEEE Computer (Forthcoming). 2024.






- **1.** Different students will need different levels of support
- 2. Access to support can be learned over a series of interactions
- 3. Access may be complementary to expertise




### **Full Access**


### Partial Access




**B\***, Sargeant\*. When Should Algorithms Resign? IEEE Computer (Forthcoming). 2024.

### Medical Community







**B\***, Sargeant\*. *When Should Algorithms Resign*? IEEE Computer (Forthcoming). 2024.