#### DS-GA 3001.009: Responsible Data Science

### Algorithmic Fairness (continued)

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# fairness in risk assessment

### New Jersey bail reform





or subjected to onerous conditions of release.

Switching from a system based solely on instinct and experience (often referred to as "gut instinct") to one in which judges have access to scientific, objective risk assessment tools could further the criminal justice system's central goals of increasing public safety, reducing crime, and making the most effective, fair, and efficient use of public resources.

Risk Assessment and Release/Detention Decision Making in New Jersey





Julia Stoyanovich

### Fairness in risk assessment

- A risk assessment tool **gives a probability estimate of a future outcome**
- Used in many domains:
  - insurance, criminal sentencing, medical testing, hiring, banking
  - also in less-obvious set-ups, like online advertising
- Fairness is concerned with how different kinds of error are distributed among sub-populations
  - Recall our discussion on fairness in classification similar?

## Racial bias in criminal sentencing

### **Machine Bias**

There's software used across the country to predict future criminals. And it's biased against blacks.

by Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu and Lauren Kirchner, ProPublica May 23, 2016 A commercial tool **COMPAS** automatically predicts some categories of future crime to assist in bail and sentencing decisions. It is used in courts in the US.

Prediction Fails Differently for Black Defendants					
	WHITE	AFRICAN AMERICAN			
Labeled Higher Risk, But Didn't Re-Offend	23.5%	44.9%			
Labeled Lower Risk, Yet Did Re-Offend	47.7%	28.0%			

Overall, Northpointe's assessment tool correctly predicts recidivism 61 percent of the time. But blacks are almost twice as likely as whites to be labeled a higher risk but not actually re-offend. It makes the opposite mistake among whites: They are much more likely than blacks to be labeled lower risk but go on to commit other crimes. (Source: ProPublica analysis of data from Broward County, Fla.)

https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing



## Desirable properties of risk tools

[J. Kleinberg, S. Mullainathan, M. Raghavan; ITCS (2017)]

"risk assessment tool / instrument" = "**risk tool / instrument**" for brevity in the rest of today's slides

- Calibration
- Balance for the positive class
- Balance for the negative class

### can we have all these properties?

### Calibration

positive outcomes: do recidivate

		risk score	
	0.2	0.6	0.8
white			
black		$\begin{array}{c} \bigcirc & \oplus & \oplus \\ \bigcirc & \bigcirc & \oplus & \oplus \\ & \bigcirc & \oplus & \oplus \\ & & \oplus & \oplus \end{array}$	

#### given the output of a risk tool, likelihood of belonging to the positive class is independent of group membership

0.6 means 0.6 for any defendant - likelihood of recidivism

why do we want calibration?




## Calibration in COMPAS

[J. Kleinberg, S. Mullainathan, M. Raghavan; ITCS 2017]

Predictive parity (also called calibration)

an risk tool identifies a set of instances as having probability *x* of constituting positive instances, then approximately an *x* fraction of this set are indeed positive instances, over-all and in sub-populations

COMPAS is **well-calibrated**: in the window around 40%, the fraction of defendants who were re-arrested is ~40%, both over-all and per group.



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### Balance

[J. Kleinberg, S. Mullainathan, M. Raghavan; ITCS 2017]

- Balance for the positive class: Positive instances are those who go on to re-offend. The average score of positive instances should be the same across groups.
- Balance for the negative class: Negative instances are those who do not go on to re-offend. The average score of negative instances should be the same across groups.
- Generalization of: Both groups should have equal false positive rates and equal false negative rates.
- Different from statistical parity!

#### the chance of making a mistake does not depend on race

### Desiderata, re-stated

[J. Kleinberg, S. Mullainathan, M. Raghavan; ITCS (2017)]

- For each group, a  $v_b$  fraction in each bin **b** is positive
- Average score of positive class same across groups
- Average score of negative class same across groups

#### can we have all these properties?

### Achievable only in trivial cases

[J. Kleinberg, S. Mullainathan, M. Raghavan; ITCS (2017)]

- Perfect information: the tool knows who recidivates (score 1) and who does not (score 0)
- Equal base rates: the fraction of positive-class people is the same for both groups

### cannot even find a good approximate solution

#### a negative result, need tradeoffs

### proof sketched out in (starts 12 min in)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UUC8tMNxwV8

### Group fairness impossibility result

[A. Chouldechova; arXiv:1610.07524v1 (2017)]

If a predictive instrument **satisfies predictive parity**, but the **prevalence** of the phenomenon **differs between groups**, then the instrument **cannot achieve** equal false positive rates and equal false negative rates across these groups

Recidivism rates in the ProPublica dataset are higher for the black group than for the white group

https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm What is recidivism?: Northpointe [*the maker of COMPAS*] defined recidivism as "a finger-printable arrest involving a charge and a filing for any uniform crime reporting (UCR) code."

### Fairness for whom?

<b>Decision-maker</b> : of those I've labeled high-risk, how	ł	based on a slide by <i>i</i>	Arvind Narayar
many will recidivate?		labeled low-risk	labeled high-risk
<b>Defendant</b> : how likely am I to be incorrectly classified high-risk?	did not recidivate	TN	FP
<b>Society</b> : (think positive interventions) is the selected set demographically balanced?	recidivated	FN	TP

different metrics matter to different stakeholders https://www.propublica.org/article/propublica-responds-tocompanys-critique-of-machine-bias-story

### Impossibility theorem

Metric	Equalized under	based on a slide by Arvind Narayanan
Selection probability	Demographic parity	
Pos. predictive value	Predictive parity	Chouldechova
Neg. predictive value		paper
False positive rate	Error rate balance	
False negative rate	Error rate balance	
Accuracy	Accuracy equity	

All these metrics can be expressed in terms of FP, FN, TP, TN

If these metrics are equal for 2 groups, some trivial algebra shows that the prevalence (in the COMPAS example, of recidivism, as measured by re-arrest) is also the same for 2 groups

Nothing special about these metrics, can pick any 3!

## Ways to evaluate binary classifiers

#### based on a slide by Arvind Narayanan

		True condition					
	Total population	Condition positive	Condition negative	$\frac{\text{Prevalence}}{\Sigma \text{ Total population}} = \frac{\Sigma \text{ Condition positive}}{\Sigma \text{ Total population}}$	Σ True positive	cy (ACC) = + Σ True negative population	
Predicted	Predicted condition positive	<b>True positive</b> , Power	<b>False positive,</b> Type I error	Positive predictive value (PPV), Precision = $\Sigma$ True positive $\overline{\Sigma}$ Predicted condition positive	Σ False	ery rate (FDR) = e positive ondition positive	
condition	Predicted condition negative	<b>False negative</b> , Type II error	True negative	False omission rate (FOR) = $\Sigma$ False negative $\Sigma$ Predicted condition negative	Negative predictive value (NPV) = $\Sigma$ True negative Σ Predicted condition negative		
		True positive rate (TPR), Recall, Sensitivity, probability of detection $= \frac{\Sigma \text{ True positive}}{\Sigma \text{ Condition positive}}$	False positive rate (FPR), Fall-out, probability of false alarm $= \frac{\Sigma \text{ False positive}}{\Sigma \text{ Condition negative}}$	Positive likelihood ratio (LR+) = $\frac{\text{TPR}}{\text{FPR}}$	Diagnostic odds ratio (DOR)	F <sub>1</sub> score =	
		False negative rate (FNR), Miss rate = $\frac{\Sigma \text{ False negative}}{\Sigma \text{ Condition positive}}$	True negative rate (TNR), Specificity (SPC) = $\frac{\Sigma \text{ True negative}}{\Sigma \text{ Condition negative}}$	Negative likelihood ratio (LR-) = $\frac{FNR}{TNR}$	$=\frac{LR+}{LR-}$	$\frac{2}{\frac{1}{\text{Recall}} + \frac{1}{\text{Precision}}}$	


#### 364 impossibility theorems :)




### Individual fairness

#### based slides by Arvind Narayanan

### Individual fairness: assuming scores are calibrated, we cannot pick a single threshold for 2 groups that equalizes both the False Positives Rate and the False Negatives Rate





### What's the right answer?

### There is no single answer!

### **Need transparency and public debate**

- Consider harms and benefits to different stakeholders
- Being transparent about which fairness criteria we use, how we trade them off
- Recall "Learning Fair Representations": a typical ML approach

$$L = A_z \cdot L_z + A_x \cdot L_x + A_y \cdot L_y$$
  
group individual  
fairness fairness  
apples + oranges + fairness = ?

# causal interpretations of fairness

### Effect on sub-populations

#### Simpson's paradox

disparate impact at the full population level disappears or reverses when looking at sub-populations!

		grad schoo	positive	
		admitted	denied	outcomes
ler	F	1512	2809	35% of women
gender	Μ	3715	4727	44% of men

UC Berkeley 1973: it appears men were admitted at higher rate.

### Effect on sub-populations

#### Simpson's paradox

disparate impact at the full population level disappears or reverses when looking at sub-populations!

Department	Ме	en	Won	nen	favored group	whole population
Department	Applicants	Admitted	Applicants	Admitted		
Α	825	62%	108	82%	women	35%
В	560	63%	25	68%	women	of women
С	325	37%	593	34%	men	
D	417	33%	375	35%	women	4.40/
E	191	28%	393	24%	men	44% of men
F	373	6%	341	7%	women	OFFICI

UC Berkeley 1973: women applied to more competitive departments, with low rates of admission among qualified applicants.

### Correlation is not causation!

Cannot claim a causal relationship based on observational data alone. Need a story.

4.5 Direct and Indirect Effects

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


Figure 4.9 Causal relationships relevant to Berkeley's sex discrimination study. Adjusting for department choice  $(X_2)$ or career objective (Z) (or both) would be inappropriate in estimating the direct effect of gender on admission. The appropriate adjustment is given in (4.10).

> X2 (choice) - "resolving variable", then the effect of X1 on Y through X2 is "fair"

- $X_1$  = applicant's gender;
- $X_2$  = applicant's choice of department;
- Z = applicant's (pre-enrollment) career objectives;
- Y = admission outcome (accept/reject);
- U = applicant's aptitude (unrecorded).

Note that U affects applicant's career objective and also the admission outcome Y (say, through verbal skills (unrecorded)).

the direct effect of X1 on Y is unfair


from Pearl's "Causality", page 129



### Causal interpretations of fairness

[T.J. VanderWeele and W.R. Robinson; Epidemiology (2014)]

arrows represent possible causal relationships



#### we (society) decide which of these are "OK"

# fairness in ranking

## Fairness in ranking

[K. Yang & J. Stoyanovich, FATML (2016)]

Input: database of items (individuals, colleges, cars, ...)

Score-based ranker: computes the score of each item using known formula, then sorts items on score

**Output:** permutation of the items (complete or top-k)

<u>id</u>	sex	race	age	cat		
а	F	W	25	Т		
b	F	В	23	S	ranker	
С	М	W	27	Т		
d	М	В	45	S		
е	М	W	60	U		

What is a positive outcome in a ranking?

Idea: Rankings are relative, fairness measures should be rank-aware

## The order of things

### THE NEW YORKER

**THE ORDER OF THINGS** What college rankings really tell us.



- 1. Chevrolet Corvette 205
- 2. Lotus Evora 195
- 3. Porsche Cayman 195

1. Lotus Evora 205

2. Porsche Cayman 198

3. Chevrolet Corvette 192

1. Porsche Cayman 193

2. Chevrolet Corvette 186

3. Lotus Evora 182



### Rankings are not benign!

### THE NEW YORKER

THE ORDER OF THINGS What college rankings really tell us.



**Rankings are not benign.** They enshrine very particular ideologies, and, at a time when American higher education is facing a crisis of accessibility and affordability, we have adopted **a de-facto standard of college quality** that is uninterested in both of those factors. And why? Because a group of magazine analysts in an office building in Washington, D.C., decided twenty years ago to **value selectivity over efficacy**, to **use proxies** that scarcely relate to what they're meant to be proxies for, and to **pretend that they can compare** a large, diverse, low-cost land-grant university in rural Pennsylvania with a small, expensive, private Jewish university on two campuses in Manhattan.



### Location-location-location

#### [K. Yang & J. Stoyanovich, FATML (2016)] gender is the sensitive attribute, input is balanced

Algorithm 1 Ranking generator								
<b>Require:</b> Ranking $\tau$ , fairness probability $f$ .			_					
{Initialize the output ranking $\sigma$ .}	rank	gender		rank	gender		rank	gender
1: $\sigma \leftarrow \emptyset$	1	M		1	M		1	M
$2: \tau^+ = \tau \cap S^+$								
3: $\boldsymbol{\tau}^- = \boldsymbol{\tau} \cap S^-$	2	Μ		2	M		2	F
4: while $(\tau^+ \neq \emptyset) \land (\tau^- \neq \emptyset)$ do	3	Μ		3	F		3	М
5: $p = random([0, 1])$ 6: <b>if</b> $p < f$ <b>then</b>	4	М		4	М		4	F
7: Pop an item from the top of the list $\tau^+$ .	5	М		5	М		5	М
8: $\sigma \leftarrow pop(\tau^+)$	6	F		6	F		6	F
9: else	7	F		7	М		7	М
10: Pop an item from the top of the list $\tau^-$ .	8	F		8	F		8	F
11: $\sigma \leftarrow pop(\tau^{-})$				_				
12: <b>end if</b>	9	F		9	F		9	Μ
13: end while	10	F		10	F		10	F
14: $\sigma \leftarrow \tau^+$	£	-0	1		0.2	1	£	0.5
15: $\sigma \leftarrow \tau^-$	J	=0		J =	0.3		J =	= 0.5
16: return $\sigma$								

### parity in outcomes



### Rank-aware fairness

#### [K. Yang & J. Stoyanovich, FATML (2016)]




Figure 3: rND on 1,000 items

Figure 4: rKL on 1,000 items

Figure 5: rRD on 1,000 items



### In an optimization framework

[K. Yang & J. Stoyanovich, FATML (2016)]





Figure 6: Accuracy and fairness on German Credit, ranked by sum of normalized attribute values, with k = 10.

## Designing fair rankers

[A. Asudeh, HV Jagadish, J. Stoyanovich, G. Das; ACM SIGMOD (2019)]





### More fairness in ranking

#### **Designing Fair Ranking Schemes**

Abolfazl Asudeh<sup>†</sup>, H. V. Jagadish<sup>†</sup>, Julia Stoyanovich<sup>‡</sup>, Gautam Das<sup>††</sup> <sup>†</sup>University of Michigan, <sup>‡</sup>Drexel University, <sup>††</sup>University of Texas at Arlington <sup>†</sup>{asudeh, jag}@umich.edu, <sup>‡</sup>stoyanovich@drexel.edu, <sup>††</sup>gdas@uta.edu

#### ACM SIGMOD 2019

#### ABSTRACT

Items from a database are often ranked based on a combination of multiple criteria. A user may have the flexibility to accept combinations that weigh these criteria differently, within limits. On the other hand, this choice of weights can greatly affect the fairness of the produced ranking. In this paper, we develop a system that helps users choose criterion weights that lead to greater fairness.

We consider ranking functions that compute the score of each item as a weighted sum of (numeric) attribute values, and then sort items on their score. Each ranking function can be expressed as a vector of weights, or as a point in a multi-dimensional space. For a broad range of fairness criteria, we show how to efficiently identify regions in this space that satisfy these criteria. Using this identification method, our system is able to tell users whether their proposed ranking function satisfies the desired fairness criteria and, if it does not, to suggest the smallest modification that does. We develop user-controllable approximation that and indexing techniques that are applied during preprocessing, and support sub-second response times during the online phase. Our extensive experiments on real datasets demonstrate that our methods are able to find solutions that

### parity in outcomes

impact processes that are directly designed and validated by humans. Perhaps the most immediate example of such a process is a score-based ranker. In this paper we consider the task of *designing a fair score-based ranking scheme*.

Ranking of individuals is ubiquitous, and is used, for example, to establish credit worthiness, desirability for college admissions and employment, and attractiveness as dating partners. A prominent family of ranking schemes are score-based rankers, which compute the score of each individual from some database  $\mathcal{D}$ , sort the individuals in decreasing order of score, and finally return either the full ranked list, or its highest-scoring sub-set, the top-k. Many scorebased rankers compute the score of an individual as a linear combination of attribute values, with non-negative weights. Designing a ranking scheme amounts to selecting a set of weights, one for each feature, and validating the outcome on the database  $\mathcal{D}$ .

Our goal is to assist the user in designing a ranking scheme that both reflects a user's a priori notion of quality and is fair, in the sense that it mitigates *preexisting bias with respect to a protected feature* that is embodied in the data. In line with prior work [17,27, 31-33], a protected feature denotes membership of an individual



### Score-based rankers

[A. Asudeh, HV Jagadish, J. Stoyanovich, G. Das; ACM SIGMOD (2019)]

- tuple x in D; score(x): sum of attribute values, with non-negative weights (a common special case of monotone aggregation)
- weights subjectively chosen by a user: 0.5 g+ 0.5s, where g normalized GPA, s normalized SAT; why not 0.45 g + 0.55 s?


	$\mathcal{D}$	f	
id	$x_1$	$x_2$	$x_1 + x_2$
$t_1$	0.63	0.71	1.34
$t_2$	0.72	0.65	1.37
$t_3$	0.58	0.78	1.36
$t_4$	0.7	0.68	1.38
$t_5$	0.53	0.82	1.35
$t_6$	0.61	0.79	1.4



## Geometry of a (2D) ranker

[A. Asudeh, HV Jagadish, J. Stoyanovich, G. Das; ACM SIGMOD (2019)]

	$\mathcal{D}$	f	
id	$x_1$	$x_2$	$x_1 + x_2$
$t_1$	0.63	0.71	1.34
$t_2$	0.72	0.65	1.37
$t_3$	0.58	0.78	1.36
$t_4$	0.7	0.68	1.38
$t_5$	0.53	0.82	1.35
$t_6$	0.61	0.79	1.4



- tuples are points in 2D, scoring functions are rays starting from the origin
- to determine a ranking of the points, we read it off from the projections of the points onto the ray of the scoring function, walking the ray towards the origin

• examples: 
$$f(x) = x_1 + x_2$$
  $f(x) = x_1$   $f(x) = x_2$ 



### Goal: find a satisfactory function

[A. Asudeh, HV Jagadish, J. Stoyanovich, G. Das; ACM SIGMOD (2019)]

Closest Satisfactory Function: Given a dataset  $\mathcal{D}$  with nitems over d scalar scoring attributes, a fairness oracle O:  $\nabla_f(\mathcal{D}) \rightarrow \{\top, \bot\}$ , and a linear scoring function f with the weight vector  $\vec{w} = \langle w_1, w_2, \cdots, w_d \rangle$ , find the function f' with the weight vector  $\vec{w}'$  such that  $O(\nabla_{f'}(\mathcal{D})) = \top$  and the angular distance between  $\vec{w}$  and  $\vec{w}'$  is minimized.


How might we approach this? Why is this difficult?



### Ordering exchange

[A. Asudeh, HV Jagadish, J. Stoyanovich, G. Das; ACM SIGMOD (2019)]

**Key idea:** only look at scoring functions that change the relative order between some pair of points. These are the only points where the fairness oracle may change its mind!



An **ordering exchange** is a set of functions that score a pair of points equally. In 2D, it corresponds to a single function.


## Outline of approach

[A. Asudeh, HV Jagadish, J. Stoyanovich, G. Das; ACM SIGMOD (2019)]

#### **Pre-processing**

- Transform the original space into the dual space (in 2D, points become lines)
- Sort points per f(x)=x; compute ordering exchanges between adjacent pairs of points
- Sweep the space with a ray from the x-axis to the y-axis, find satisfactory regions

<i>t</i> <sub>1</sub>	1	3.5
<i>t</i> <sub>2</sub>	1.5	3.1
<i>t</i> 3	1.91	2.3
<i>t</i> 4	2.3	1.8
<i>t</i> <sub>5</sub>	3.2	0.9







## Outline of approach

[A. Asudeh, HV Jagadish, J. Stoyanovich, G. Das; ACM SIGMOD *(2019)*] At query time

- Look for a satisfactory region closest to the query function
- In 2D, this is simply binary search
- Beyond 2D, everything is hard, and expensive to compute







## And lots more algorithmic + systems work

[A. Asudeh, HV Jagadish, J. Stoyanovich, G. Das; ACM SIGMOD (2019)]


- Multi-dimensional indexing methods for "arrangement construction"
- Sampling of items (does work), sampling of functions (doesn't work) to speed up index construction
- Experiments on COMPAS and on US Department of Transportation (DOT) - flights / airlines - datasets

#### Follow-up work on designing fair ranking functions

### Looking at trade-offs

#### [K. Yang, V. Gkatzelis, J. Stoyanovich, IJCAI (2019)]

#### **Balanced Ranking with Diversity Constraints**



### parity in outcomes

gineering

### <sup>du</sup> IJCAI 2019

sociologists and political sciki, 2005]. Last but not least, ed to ensure dataset represenelecting a group of patients to edical treatment, or to underiedical services [Cohen *et al.*, isit in this paper.

evaluate and mitigate an unindiversity constraints may have tion and ranking algorithms. it these algorithms do not sys-/ items in particular groups. In -up more precise.

associated with multiple sena quality score (or utility), a to select k of these items aimtility, computed as the sum of s. The score of an item is a omputed and stored as a physnputed on the fly. The output

### loss balance



Julia Stoyanovich

## Ranking with diversity constraints

[K. Yang, V. Gkatzelis, J. Stoyanovich, IJCAI (2019)]

**Goal**: pick k=4 candidates, including 2 of each gender, and at least one candidate per ethnicity, maximizing the total score of the selected candidates.

	Male		Female		
White	A (99)	B (98)	C (96)	D (95)	score=37
Black	E (91)	F (91)	G (90)	H (89)	
Asian	I (87)	J (87)	K (86)	L (83)	

Table 1: A set of 12 individuals with sensitive attributes race and gender. Each cell lists an individual's ID, and score in parentheses.

**Problem**: **In-group fairness fails** for Female (C and D not picked, which G and K are), Black (E and F are not picked, while G is), and Asian (I and J are not picked, while K is). **In-group fairness holds** for White and Male groups though (those with higher scores)!

3

## Ranking with diversity constraints

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**Goal**: pick k=4 candidates, including 2 of each gender, and at least one candidate per ethnicity, maximizing the total score of the selected candidates.

	Male		Female		
White	A (99)	B (98)	C (96)	D (95)	
Black	E (91)	F (91)	G (9())	H (89)	score=372
Asian	I (87)	J (87)	K (86)	L (83)	30016-072

Table 1: A set of 12 individuals with sensitive attributes race and gender. Each cell lists an individual's ID, and score in parentheses.

**Problem**: **In-group fairness fails** for Female (C and D not picked, which G and K are), Black (E and F are not picked, while G is), and Asian (I and J are not picked, while K is). **In-group fairness holds** for White and Male groups though (those with higher scores)!

**Insight**: while in-group fairness will inevitably fail to some extent because of diversity constraints, this loss should be **balanced** across groups.

## Trading off utility, diversity and fairness

[K. Yang, V. Gkatzelis, J. Stoyanovich, IJCAI (2019)]

Goal: select and rank k items

**Utility**: each item has a score, maximize the sum of scores of selected items

**Diversity**: items have labels, pick at least  $K_{v,p}$  items for each label v in each prefix of length p < k

**Fairness**: ensure that **loss is balanced** across all groups. We call this in-group fairness, **IGF**.




What's a good IGF measure?

Julia Stoyanovich

### Balancing loss across groups

[K. Yang, V. Gkatzelis, J. Stoyanovich, IJCAI (2019)]



#### ordered list of female students


#### use an ILP, to maximize utility, subject to diversity and IGF loss constraints

Also propose another measure, *IGFAgg*, see paper.



### Exploring the trade-off

[K. Yang, V. Gkatzelis, J. Stoyanovich, IJCAI (2019)]



MEPS (Medical Expenditure Panel Survey): sensitive attributes race and age